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I. Introduction 
The concept of the new Code of Criminal Procedure enacted 11 February, 20151 is built 
around the hexagon of the following major codification principles: efficiency, speed, 
simplicity, modernity, coherence and purposiveness.2 More specifically, the Concept also 
specifies 14 centres of gravity (regulatory principles) for the new legislation. However, 
the Concept emphasizes that "the preparation of the new Code of Criminal Procedure shall 
involve full review of the Code of Criminal Procedure with each and every provision 
checked for possible need for alteration or amendment".3 
In light of the foregoing, this study focuses on one of the most sensitive areas related to 
evidences in criminal proceedings, namely the evaluation and admissibility of unlawfully 
obtained means of evidence and the resulting evidence matters. Even though the regulatory 
principles of the Concept imply that the legislator does not put the focus of the new 
codification on the re-definition of (the general and/or special clauses of) unlawfully 
obtained evidence, I still state that it would be reasonable to review this legal facility. 
adjunktus, Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Büntetőjogi és Büntető Eljárásjogi Tanszék 
1 Regulation principles of the new Code of Criminal Procedure - The proposal that was accepted at the 
Government's assembly on 11 February, 2015 (Regulatory Principles 2015). Source: http://www.kormány. 
hu/download/d/12/40000/20150224%201M%20el%C5%91teijeszt%C3%A9s%20az%20%C3%BAj%20b%C3% 
BCntet%C5%91 elj%C3%Al r%C3%Al si%20t%C3%B6rv%C3%A9ny%20szab%C3%Al lyoz%C3%Al si%20e 
lveir%C5%911.pdf (download: 27 February, 2016.) 
2 The new legislation "forms a step of the criminal law reform initiated by the enactment of Act C of 2012 (the new 
Criminal Code). The objective is to establish criminal proceedings that are suitable to effectively address practical 
issues in accordance with rule of law requirements and to supersede Act XIX of 1998, the unity of which has 
broken due to several linguistic amendments throughout the years." MLSKOLCZI BARNA: AZ új büntetőeljárási 
törvény kodifikációs irányelvei, in: ELEK BALÁZS - MLSKOLCZI BARNA (ed.): Úton a bírói meggyőződés felé. A 
készülő új büntetőeljárási törvény kodifikációja. Printart-Press, Debrecen, 2015. p. 30. 
3 Regulatory Principles 2015. p. 32. 
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The legal facility in question is the requirement of ensuring fair proceedings4 which 
has been defined in the Concept as a core principle5. Unlawfully obtained evidence makes 
two interests conflict with each other: the requirement of holding the defendant liable 
under criminal law on the one side and the legal conformity of the proceedings and the 
rights of the defendant on the other. The previous interest requires that no evidence 
suitable for establishing liability: under criminal law (including conclusive proof where 
applicable) shall be excluded on the sole ground of having been obtained in breach of a 
legal regulation.6 According to the latter interest, we must not forget about the importance 
of ensuring compliance with the legality of criminal procedures and with the rights of 
participants in the criminal procedure including in particular the defendant.7 
This study consists of two major units. As a first step (refer to Section II), I laid the 
foundation by presenting the general clause of the current and valid Code of Criminal Procedure 
concerning unlawfully obtained evidence and the legal practices built on this general clause. 
The second unit (refer to Section III) focuses on the description and evaluation of 
conceptual suggestions which relate to this topic and have appeared mainly in criminal 
proceeding law publications. 
4 The right to fair proceeding is a guarantee adopted from anglo-saxon law schemes. The essential aspects of this 
right were first declared at international levels in Section 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (dated 4th November, 1950 in Rome, Italy). BÉNÉDICT, JÉRÔME: Le sort des preuves 
illégales dans le procès pénal. Pro Schola, Lausanne, 1994. p. 301.; This Convention was adopted into Hungarian 
law by means of Act XXXI of 1993. HOLLÁN MIKLÓS - OSZTOVITS ANDRÁS: A tisztességes eljáráshoz való jog -
az (1) bekezdés magyarázata, in: JAKAB ANDRÁS (ed.): Az Alkotmány kommentálja. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 
2009. p. 2059. The right to fair proceeding (trial) is also addressed in Section XXVIH of the Fundamental Law 
which section also covers other fundamental norms of the more broadly construed constitutional criminal law. 
LÉVAY MIKLÓS: Büntetőhatalom és Alkotmány, különös tekintettel a bűncselekménnyé nyilvánításra és a 
büntetésekre, in: DRINÓCZI TÍMEA - JAKAB ANDRÁS (ed): Alkotmányozás Magyarországon. Pázmány Press, 
Budapest-Pécs, 2013. p. 213. 
5 The scheme of distinction of "core principles" or "super principles" from standard principles was established by 
Tremmel Flórián. HERKE CSONGOR - FENYVESI CSABA - TREMMEL FLÓRIÁN: A büntető eljárásjog elmélete. 
Dialóg-Campus, Budapest-Pécs, 2012. pp. 50-52. 
6 Kis LÁSZLÓ: A jogellenesen beszerzett bizonyítási eszközök sorsa néhány külföldi állam és hazánk 
büntetőeljárásában, in: SZABÓ KRISZTIÁN (ed.): Az új büntetőeljárási törvény első éve. Debreceni Konferenciák 
IV., Debrecen, 2005. p. 57. 
7 An interesting note is that Bencze Mátyás also mentioned double conflict of interests when he studied the 
presumption of innocence. (These interests, namely the effectiveness of criminal justice services and the protection 
of the defendants rights, appear not only in the assessment of the presumption of innocence but also in the 
conduction of any and all criminal proceeding actions and thus in the evaluation of unlawfully obtained evidence.) 
He states that making criminal proceedings effective and efficient requires rules "which help reveal justice, while 
the restrictions imposed on criminal justice services shall ensure that potential errors and issues are minimized and 
individuals subjected to proceedings get the chance to defend themselves. The real issue to be solved by the 
legislator is assigning the proper weight and significance to each of these interests. The interest of the community 
(as a whole unit of the society) lies in the most effective possible operation of justice services (i.e. without formal 
barriers). However, what the community is perceived as the entirety of individuals, it obviously becomes 
important to ensure that defendants are granted proper guarantees and the right to Sir proceedings". BENCZE 
MÁTYÁS: Az ártatlanság vélelmének érvényesülése a magyar büntetőbíróságok gyakorlatában. 
http V/jog. unideb.hu/docum en ts/tanszekek^ogbolc^leti/publikci^ 
(download: 1 July, 2013.) 
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II. General clause concerning the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence 
Even though this study is not aimed at historical researches, I have to take note of the fact 
that the first time the general clause of exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence was 
mentioned in the codified Hungarian criminal proceeding law was Act I of1973 (Code of 
Criminal Procedure - A büntetőeljárásról szóló törvény, hereinafter referred to as the Old 
Be.): "The results of evidence procedures conducted in breach of the provisions of this 
Act must not be considered as evidence."8 The former written criminal proceeding codes 
(i.e. Act XXXIII of 1896 - Criminal Procedure? Act III of 1951- Criminal Procedure?" 
and "Act" 8 of 1962 - Code of Criminal Procedure) only defined the sanctions linked to 
each mean of evidence (i.e. voidness or non-observance) when the evidence was obtained 
in breach of the procedural rules. 
After the Old Be. had been criticized for its inaccurate general clause definition,11 the 
current and valid criminal proceedings act (Act XIX of 1998 on Code of Criminal 
Procedure, A büntetőeljárásról szóló törvény, hereinafter referred to as the Be.) has brought 
more exact and precise provision concerning the general clause of unlawfully obtained 
evidence. "Facts derived from means of evidence that were obtained by the court, the 
prosecutor or the investigating authority by way of committing a criminal offence, by other 
illicit methods or by the substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the participants 
may not be admitted as evidence."12 This provision implies that the legislator has dual 
purpose. First, it shall try to exclude from Hungarian criminal proceedings (or sanction it, if 
it has already happened) the concept of "obtaining evidence at all costs". On the other hand, 
this exclusion (or sanctioning) is "only" permitted in three cases: when the evidence is 
obtained by way of committing a criminal offence [Aspect I], by other illicit method [Aspect 
II] or by substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the participants [Aspect IE]. In my 
opinion, the indicated ruling gives a more accurate (but not entirely accurate) provisions 
concerning the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence. It leaves several questions 
open which shall be answered by jurisprudence and case law. 
8 Article 60 (3) of Old Be. 
9 See: Article 135,204,205-206,229,304,310,331,353,363,382 (2) sentence; Article 384 5. and 8. point; Article 404. 
10 See: Article 4,55-57,59 (2), 94 (4) 2. sentence; Article 160 (2). 
1' The general wording of the referenced provision has caused practical interpretation issues. In terms of grammar, 
the provision can be understood in a way to think that any kind of technical olfence will result in the exclusion of 
the proof. However, it also implies that proofs obtained in other (i.e. non-criminal) proceedings even by material 
breach of the law may be appreciated (i.e. utilized) in the criminal proceeding. The weight of this issue is indicated 
by the fact that even the superior judicial forum, the Supreme Court (Legfelsőbb Bíróság) has not been able to 
establish unified legal practices in this matter. CSÉKA ERVIN - VIDA MIHÁLY: A büntető eljárási jog vázlata I. 
JATEPress, Szeged, 1999. p. 195..; CSÉKA ERVIN: „Örökzöld" kérdések a büntető bizonyításban, in.: FARKAS 
ÁKOS - GÖRGÉNYI ILONA - LÉVAI MIKLÓS (ed.): Ünnepi Tanulmányok Horváth Tibor 70 . születésnapjára. 
Miskolc, 1997. p. 175.; BÁRD KÁROLY: Emberi jogok és büntető igazságszolgáltatás Európában. A tisztességes 
eljárás büntetőügyekben - emberijog-dogmatikai értekezés. Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó, Budapest, 2 0 0 7 . 
2 3 2 - 2 3 3 . pp.; LÖRINCZY GYÖRGY: Gondolatok a bizonyítási eljárás törvényességéről a büntető eljárásban. Acta 
Jur. et Pol. (Tom. Lm, Fase. 15.) Szeged, 1998. p. 211. ; GÁCSI ANETT ERZSÉBET: Unlawfully Obtained Evidence 
in the Hungarian Criminal Procedure, in: KARSAI KRISZTINA - SZOMORA ZSOLT (ed.): Bosphorus Seminar. 
Papers of a Bilingual Seminar on Comparative Criminal Law. Beiträge eines zweisprachigen Seminars über. 
Straffechtsvergleichung. Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Szeged, 2015. p. 32. 
12 Article 78 (4) of Be. 
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This study does not go into the details of each aspect but rather summarizes them just 
as much as necessary to elaborate on the topic (refer to Section II. 1). This study focuses 
(refer to Section II.2) on my hypotheses concerning the evaluation of unlawfully obtained 
evidence and on justifying such hypotheses. 
II. 1. The aspects of the general clause 
II. 1.1. Exclusion of evidence obtained "by way of committing a criminal offence" 
By way of committing a criminal offence (Aspect 1 of general clause) needs the least 
explanation. Criminal offence shall be construed as a fact or circumstance specifically 
defined in the special part of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (a Büntető Törvénykönyvről, 
hereinafter referred to as the Btk.). The scope of relevant criminal offences is certainly 
restricted as the criminal offence mentioned herein must have been committed by an official 
such as a member of the court, the prosecution service or the investigating authority. 
It includes, in particular, enforcing of statement (Article 303 of Btk.) which is directly 
aimed at the unlawful obtaining of statements (in particular the defendant's statement) as 
means of evidence. Other types of criminal offence committed by officials, including 
abuse of office (Article 305 of Btk.), mistreatment in official proceedings (Article 301 of 
Btk.), covert investigation and covert information gathering without authorization (Article 
307 of Btk.), and unlawful detention (Article 304 of Btk.), may be included in this scope 
only if it is ascertainable that the authority has directly obtained any means of evidence 
relevant to the particular proceeding by way of committing this criminal offence. 
Furthermore, abetting after the fact [Article 282 (3) (d) of Btk.], falsifications of different 
documents by a public official (Article 343 of Btk.) and passive corruption of public 
officials (Article 294 of Btk.), may also be relevant to Aspect 1 in Article 78 (4) of Be.13 
II. 1.2. Exclusion of evidence obtained "by other illicit methods" 
By way other illicit methods (Aspect 2 of general clause): The difficulty of application 
of this aspect lies in the failure of the legislator to precisely define what is meant under 
"by other illicit methods". The science of criminal proceedings and legal practices have 
joined their forces to fix this issue. In doing so, the scientific approach suggests that "other 
illicit method" shall be construed as such a procedural offence or breach of an instruction 
or regulation which makes the evidence's legality ambiguous but cannot, by itself, give 
rise to the conclusion of a criminal offence.14 
In my opinion, there are two categories within evidence unlawfully obtained by other 
illicit method. The first category includes violation of special prohibitions associated with 
certain means of evidence (i.e. special clauses for unlawfully obtained evidence). The second 
1 3 G Á C S I 2 0 1 5 , P. 32 . 
14 Vö.: BÁNÁTI JÁNOS ET AL.: Büntető eljárásjog. HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2009. p. 110. 
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category includes prohibitions of evidence involving the influencing of the interrogated 
person's state of mind.15 
II. 1.3. Exclusion of evidence obtained "by the substantial restriction of the procedural 
rights of the participants" 
Obtaining evidence by the substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the 
participants (Aspect III of the general clause) shall mean a legal offense that essentially 
affects any of the participant's procedural rights and leaves the court uncertain about the 
authenticity of the evidence. With regards to this aspect, my de lege ferenda suggestion 
applies to the subjective side of the aspect. 
My opinion is that the use of plural form is confusing in this case (even if it indicates 
that protection is available not only for the defendant but also for all other participants in 
the procedure). For Aspect 3 to be grammatically appropriate and applicable, at least two 
participants' procedural rights need to be violated or restricted.16 (The "new" wording of 
the legislation is presented in Section II.2.2.) 
II. 2. Hypotheses concerning the evaluation of unlawfully obtained evidence17 
II.2.1. Necessity of the general clause 
The first hypothesis I addressed in this topic is that evidence prohibition, as defined in 
the proceedings act in the form of general clause, is necessary (also in the new Code) as the 
risk of so-called "guarantee inflation" does not allow for the assignment of evidence 
prohibition to each procedural rule in the form of special clauses.18 This hypothesis seems to 
be justified as the legal cases reviewed indicate that, if the sanctioning for unlawfully obtained 
evidence was not stipulated by law in the form of a general clause, the authorities (and the 
judges) could potentially gain absolute power. In other words, I disagree with the standpoint 
according to which "the use of generally defined evidence prohibitions (i.e. general clauses) is 
adverse as they are difficult to interpret and even more difficult to enforce [.. .]"19 
In my opinion, the general clause for unlawfully obtained evidence may be the very 
asset to ensure that evidence and means of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal 
proceedings are (or may be) excluded by legal ground. However, I do not doubt that 
special clauses are required for the efficient application of the general clause. However, 
for special clauses, it has to be noted that it is impossible to link guarantee to each and 
15 GÁCSI ANETT ERZSÉBET: Bizonyítási tilalmak a magyar büntetőeljárásban: a törvénysértő (jogellenes) 
bizonyítékok kizárása, in: JUHÁSZ ZSUZSANNA - NAGY FERENC - FANTOLY ZSANETT (ed.): Ünnepi Kötet Dr. 
Cséka Ervin Professzor 90. születésnapjára. Acta Jur. et Pol. Szeged, 2012. 175-180. pp. 
16 GÁCSI 2015,38-39. pp. 
17 The hypotheses described below were established based on cases from Hungarian judicial practice between 2006 
and 2015. For more infoimation on methodology, please refer to: GÁCSI ANETT ERZSÉBET: A jogellenesen 
megszerzett bizonyítékok értékelése a büntetőeljárásban. PhD Dissertation. Szeged, 2015. 15-16. pp. 
18 At this point, my hypothesis crosses path with Regulatory Principle 2 in the Concept Regulatory Principles 2015, 
9-10. pp. 
19 HERKE-FENYVESI-TREMMEL 2012,145-146. pp. 
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every- procedural institution (such guarantees include, for example, the requirement of 
recording the Miranda warning given to the defendant into the minutes and that failure to 
satisfy this requirement shall cause the so obtained defendant confession to be excluded 
from the scope of evidence) as this would lead to guarantee inflation (i.e. real and reliable 
guarantees would lose their significance). 
The rule of "repeated warning" is a great example in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(more precisely, the hearing of witnesses) why a general clause is needed:20 according to 
this rule, when and if it is ascertainable that a witness puts a criminal charge on himself or 
herself or one if his or her relatives, the witness shall be warned again in both the 
investigatory and judicial stages of the proceedings (in addition to the general warning) 
that he or she is not under the obligation to provide testimony.21 As far as repeated 
warnings are concerned, the Code of Criminal Procedure orders that both the warning and 
the response of the witness thereto be recorded in the minutes. However, failure to provide 
the repeated warning does not render the evidence inadmissible (as it does with the failure 
to provide the general warning). The question arises whether the testimony can be 
excluded from the scope of admissible evidence when the relative to be heard as witness is 
not given the repeated warning with regards to his or her relative right to exemption. 
According to the legal practice, it cannot be excluded (refer to Edition 97, Volume 2014 
of IH) as the rule is not backed by a special clause for the exclusion of evidence. In my 
opinion, however, the legislator introduced the rule of repeated warning into the Be. as an 
additional, real guarantee for the right of exemption [refer to Article 82 (1) (b) of Be.] 
which provides true meaning to the prohibition of self-incrimination. Therefore, it is the 
very general clause of unlawfully obtained evidence (i.e. the aspect of substantial 
restriction of the procedural rights of the participants) which renders or may render the 
testimony obtained without the repeated warning excludable from the scope of admissible 
evidence. The reason why I called Aspect HI of the general clause in this case is that the 
failure of providing repeated warning should only serve as a legal ground for exclusion of 
the testimony from the scope of admissible evidence if all three conditions for the repeated 
warning are satisfied. The reason being is that, from all of the grounds for exclusion, the 
only warning that may be repeated is the warning pertaining to Article 82 (1) (b) of Be. 
(Condition 1), provided that the cases specified in Article 82 (4) of Be., do not exist 
(Condition 2) and only if it is ascertained that the witness puts a criminal charge on 
himself or herself or his or her relative (Condition 3). Whether or not all of the conditions 
are met is a matter of decision by the acting judge. 
H.2.2. Clarification of the general clause's definition 
My second hypothesis concerned the wording of the general clause. My thesis is: 
From a procedural-dogmatic point of view, the general clause of the current Be. 
concerning unlawfully obtained evidence needs re-wording (but not re-definition).22 
2 0 GÁCSI ANETT ERZSÉBET: A tanú mentességi jogára való ismételt figyelmeztetés mint (új?) szabály a magyar 
büntetőeljárásban. Magyar Jog 2013/6.348-356. pp. 
21 Article 181 (2); 293 (3) of Be. 
22 At this point, my hypothesis may cross path with Regulatory Principle 4 in the Concept Regulatory Principles 
2015,12-14. pp. 
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With regards to that, my de lege ferenda suggestion implies that Article 78 (4) of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure should read as follows: "Factual information derived from 
means of evidence obtained by the court, the prosecutor or the investigating authority by 
way of committing a criminal offence; by other illicit methods; or by the substantial 
restriction of the procedural rights of any participant may not be admitted as evidence." 
II. 2.3. Segregation of the aspects 
The third hypothesis concerned the analysis of the individual aspects of Article 78 (4) 
of Be. My thesis is: the general clause (more specifically, Aspects 2 and 3 of the general 
clause) in the Be. [Article 78 (4)] cannot be unambiguously and distinctively interpreted 
as their segregation is not certain enough. To ensure more consistent application of law, 
criminal jurisprudence shall provide for a more specific and detailed interpretation 
background. The lack of consistent and unified application of law could deteriorate the 
rights of participants in criminal proceedings (including in particular the defendants) as 
stipulated in the Fundamental Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure due to the 
uncertain borderline between cogent and discretionary evidence prohibitions.23 
My researches have indicated that the application and segregation of the aspects "by 
other illicit method" and "by the substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the 
participants" in legal practice are indeed uncertain. For the majority of the reviewed judicial 
decisions reasons supporting the decision indicated that the evidence was obtained in breach 
of the law and therefore excluded from the proceeding under Article 78 (4) of Be., but the 
court did not make specific reference to either of the aspects. On the other hand the decisions 
were wrong. It all comes down to the observation that obtaining any means of evidence "by 
illicit method" virtually always involves "the substantial restriction of the procedural rights 
of the participants". For the latter one to be applicable on its own (i.e. without overlapping 
Aspect 2), the evidence obtained must not itself be in violation of the law but the participant 
of the proceeding must have been restricted in exercising their rights. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that Aspect 2 and 3 in Article 78 (4) of Be. could not or 
should not be distinguished from each other. Another reason why this kind of distinction 
is important is that evidences obtained pursuant to Aspect 2 (and similarly Aspect 1 as 
well) must not be utilized in the proceeding in line with the statutory prohibition and thus 
must be excluded even if it is impartial and truthful.24 Consequently, such evidence shall 
be considered absolute excluded from the evaluation.25 On the other hand, Aspect 3 leads 
to evidence relative excluded from the evaluation where the authority evaluating the 
evidence shall have the liability to decide whether or not the restriction of the procedural 
rights of the participants is substantial. 
23 At this point, my hypothesis may cross path with the Regulatory Principles, as defined in Section 13 of the 
Concept, and the detailed rules thereof. Regulatory Principles 2015,28-30. pp. 
2 4 VARGA ZOLTÁN: A bizonyítékok értékelése, in: JAKUCS TAMÁS (ed.): A büntetőeljárási törvény magyarázata. 1. 
kötet. KJK-KERSZÖV, Budapest, 2003. p. 155. 
25 CSÉKA ERVIN ET AL.: zf büntetőeljárási jog alapvonalai. I. Bába Kiadó, Szeged, 2 0 0 6 . pp. 2 2 6 - 2 2 7 . 
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III. Conceptual suggestions that have appeared in professional publications 
As I have mentioned in the "Introduction" section, the legislator did not put the focus of the 
codification on the evaluation of unlawfully obtained evidence. This leads to some sort of 
shortage as for the available conceptual suggestions relating to prohibitions for evidence. 
III. 1. Substantive justice vs. proceeding law justice (in light of unlawfully obtained evidence) 
The matter of assessment of exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, as a legal 
facility, arose general wise at the beginning of the codification works, upon assessment of 
the codification pillar, when it came to answer the question " What is the objective of 
criminal proceedings?". This legal facility is a necessary restriction on substantive justice 
CElek Balázs,26 Márki Zoltán27). 
Elek Balázs stated that justice cannot be the ultimate goal to be achieved by all means 
and at any price when it comes to the regulation of criminal proceedings since it is the very 
requirements for fair proceedings that require such guarantee for the protection of the rights 
and interests of the parties to the proceedings which might eventually and occasionally 
narrow the possibilities for bringing justice to the perpetrator and the circumstances of the 
crime. Such requirements include the prohibition of admission of evidence obtained by way 
of committing a criminal offence, by other illicit methods (e.g. violation of the defendant's 
right to remain silent, or bypassing the absolute and relative obstacles for testimonies) or by 
the substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the participants.28 
Márki Zoltán thinks that the matter of admissibility or exclusion of evidence brings a 
great deal of uncertainty to criminal proceedings nowadays and thus requires 
intervention.29 Therefore, the matter of timeliness as defined in the Concept is not a 
standalone issue but rather an interdependent factor of all of the foregoing.30 
In my opinion, putting restrictions on the process of revealing objective justice is an 
essential and necessary part of mixed criminal proceeding schemes. One of the greatest 
examples comes from a provision from the current and valid Code of Criminal Procedure. 
According to this provision, "one should try to reveal the facts extensively, completely 
and truthfully [..,]".31 The reason I am saying this is that even though the referenced legal 
provision establishes the goal for the continental schemes (i.e. revealing the substantive 
justice), the use of the word "try" implies that the path to revealing justice cannot be 
unrestricted and infinite. The principle of free evaluation of evidence (also declared in the 
Be.) is closely related to the foregoing: the reason why I state this is that, in my opinion, 
the legal facility of unlawfully obtained evidence (i.e. evidence prohibitions) serves as a 
control measure for this principle. The principle of free evaluation of evidence should not 
be mistaken for libertinage in the evidence process. 
2 6 ELEK BALÁZS: A jogerő a büntetőeljárásban. Debreceni Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar Büntető 
Eljárásjogi Tanszéke, Debrecen, 2012. p. 38. 
2 7 MÁRKI ZOLTÁN: A büntetőeljárás megújulásának lehetőségei. Ügyvédek Lapja, 2014/4. sz. pp. 2-8. 
2 8 ELEK 2 0 1 2 , p . 3 8 . 
2 9 MÁRKI 2 0 1 4 , p . 3 . 
3 0 MÁRKI 2 0 1 4 , p . 4 . 
31 Aiticle 75 (1)2. sentence of Be. 
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III. 2. Adoption of German and/or Austrian regulationf?) 
As far as the static part of criminal proceedings, more specifically the evidence 
process, is concerned, Herke Csongor addressed the issue of evidence prohibitions. Herke 
thinks that, in the codification of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislator 
should reconsider the prohibited interrogation methods regulated in the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure (nStPO) and the interrogation prohibitions declared in the Austrian 
Code of Criminal Procedure (aStPO).32 According to the nStPO, the following constitute 
prohibited interrogation methods that render the evidence obtained this way inadmissible: 
making someone tired or exhausted, administration of medication; torturing, deception, 
coercion, offering benefits not permitted by law, or other illicit interrogation methods.33 
The Austrian aStPO defines interrogation prohibitions with similar level of details. For 
example, interrogation prohibitions include non-permitted promises, non-permitted deceit, 
threatening, coercion, or asking ambiguous or unclear questions.34 
In my opinion, the aforementioned provisions of nStPO and aStPO are present in 
Hungarian criminal proceeding law even if they are not regulated in the Be. but rather 
established by legal practices. The reason why I state this is that these provisions can all be 
derived from Aspect I (obtaining evidence by way of committing a criminal offence) and 
Aspect II (obtaining evidence by other illicit methods) in Article 78 (4) of Be. The latter 
aspect can be linked not only to the means of evidence but also to the scope of evidence 
prohibitions involving influencing the interrogated person's state of consciousness. 
The question here is whether the codification of the new Code of Criminal Procedure 
has to go this deep into regulation. If it does, should this regulation be introduced into the 
general clause of unlawfully obtained evidence or into the individual special clauses? 
In my opinion, if it was introduced into the general clause, it would break the 
boundaries of the general clause. A question that could arise, for example, is that if Aspect 
II (other illicit methods) has such detailed rules attached to it, then why could Aspect III 
(substantial restriction of the procedural rights of the participants) be not clarified 
similarly within the boundaries of the general clause? The latter question also has its 
reasonable meaning in another context which I covered in my researches, namely that 
these two aspects are often mixed in legal practice in terms of their interpretation. 
Conclusively, we can now state that such detailed rules cannot be introduced into the 
general clause as it would cause the general clause to lose its general regulatory nature. 
Another question is whether it is reasonable to create so-called special clauses for 
these detailed rules. I state that it is not because no exhaustive list can be made of the 
aforementioned illicit interrogation methods and/or interrogation prohibitions. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian criminal proceeding law does not stick to exhaustive rules by 
any means; the Be., for example, contains numerous exemplary lists. In my opinion, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be broadened to a point where it would include a 
separate rule for each and every scenario. However, these foreign regulation patterns (and 
3 2 HERKE CSONGOR: AZ új büntetőeljárás kodifikációja jog-összehasonlító megközelítésben, in: ELEK BALÁZS -
MISKOLCZI BARNA (ed.): Úton a bírói meggyőződés felé. A készülő büntetőeljárási törvény kodifikációja. 
Printart-Press, Debrecen, 2015. pp. 52-54. 
33 Article 136a. I. és m. of nStPO. 
34 Article 164 (4) of aStPO. 
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the awareness of it) may bring benefits to the Hungarian legal practice as they could make 
it easier to subsume individual cases under the appropriate aspect of Article 78 (4) of Be. 
III. 3. Distinction between cases considered to be simpler and more complex 
In order for the new Code of Criminal Procedure to meet the European standards and 
ensure that proceedings are completed in a timely manner, it is essential that the subject 
matter of admissibility and exclusion of evidence needs reconsideration (and not 
necessarily re-definition). For the proceedings to be completed in a timely manner, it has 
to be ensured, in as early as the investigation phase, that the obtaining of means of 
evidence required (and just enough to underpin the major decisions affecting the 
investigation) is regulated through an effective framework. It helps to avoid unnecessary 
formalities and excessive evidence or "over-evidence".35 Therefore, the Concept says that 
the set of means and rules shall reflect the distinction between proceedings considered to 
be simpler and proceedings that are more complex and have significant subject matter. 
As far as investigations involving cases considered simpler are concerned, a more 
flexible process of obtaining and recording means of evidence could provide better 
efficiency in continuing into or diverting from court proceeding at short notice. If 
continuing into court proceeding, the centre of gravity for the evaluation of means of 
evidence may shift to the pre-court stage of the proceeding without major prejudice to the 
conclusive force of evidence (including in particular testimonies) due to lapse of time. 
Depending on the cooperation of the defendant or the limitation of applicable sanctions, 
the set of rules established for expedited and simplified investigations does not exclude the 
possibility of diverging the case into mediation and/or prosecution measures or into a 
separate simplified proceeding that affects the court proceeding.36 
On the other hand, proceedings which are considered more complex and have more 
significant subject matter may use more formal rules for obtaining means of evidence. 
However, the enforcement of such rules must not result in "double evidence" proceedings 
(which are broadly criticised across practicing professionals) that would unreasonably 
extend the duration of the proceeding.37 According to the Concept, the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure shall define such procedural rules for obtaining evidence which 
organize the method and results of obtaining means of evidence in a way so that the exact 
substance and authenticity of the evidence leave no doubt. (However, it is still unclear 
what that would mean exactly.) This regulation in combination with the facility to exercise 
the right to defence in a more active and practical manner may be suitable together to 
ensure that the investigation results are easier to use across subsequent stages of the 
proceeding. Therefore, the guarantee rules applicable to obtaining means of evidence may 
eliminate the risks associated with the loss of evidence due to potentially prolonged 
duration of the investigation.38 The question arises, most certainly, whether criminal 
offences could be distinguished from one another on this ground. (This regulatory principle 
35 Regulatory Principles 2015, pp. 29-30. 
36 Regulatory Principles 2015, p. 29. 
37 Regulatory Principles 2015, p. 29. 
38 Regulatory Principles 2015, p. 30. 
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of the new Code of Criminal Procedure is closely related to the efforts on simplifying, 
expediting and making criminal proceedings more efficient and to the review of the scheme 
of simplified criminal proceedings aimed at rendering proceedings fast and efficient.)39 
IV. Epilogue 
Finally, it is to be stressed out that, in light of the codification principles, the legislator 
should be reasonably expected to ensure, across the codification process of the new Code 
of Criminal Procedure, that the rules to be implemented and enforced are clear and 
transparent even if it "only" comes down to the interpretation of the norm's wording (i.e. 
grammatical understanding of the script).40 This is the only way to ensure that guarantee 
provisions are fully satisfied and fair procedures are not only called fair but are truly fair.41 
ANETT ERZSÉBET GÁCSI 
A JOGELLENESEN MEGSZERZETT BIZONYÍTÉKOK 
ÉRTÉKELÉSE AZ ÚJ BE. KODIFIKÁCIÓ SZELLEMÉBEN 
(Összefoglaló) 
A 2015. február 11. napján elfogadott új büntetőeljárási törvény koncepciójában42 főbb 
kodifikációs irányelvként: a hatékonyság, gyorsaság, egyszerűség, korszerűség, koherencia 
és célszerűség hexagonja került kiemelésre. A Koncepció ezen belül az új törvény 
szabályozásának 14 súlypontját (szabályozási elvét) határozza meg, hangsúlyozza 
azonban, hogy „az új büntetőeljárási törvény előkészítése során a Be. teljes körű 
felülvizsgálatát el kell végezni, minden egyes rendelkezésnél meg kell vizsgálni, hogy 
azzal kapcsolatban nem merül-e fel módosítási igény". 
Ennek fényében tanulmányomban a büntető eljárásjogi bizonyítás egyik legérzékenyebb 
területét: a jogellenesen megszerzett bizonyítási eszközök és az azokból származó 
bizonyítékok értékelésének / felhasználhatóságának a kérdését vizsgáltam meg. A 
39 Regulatory Principles 2015, p. 30. 
4 0 SZABÓ KRISZTIÁN: A nyelvtani értelmezés jelentősége a büntetőeljárási kodijikáció során, in: ELEK BALÁZS -
MISKOLCZI BARNA (ed.): Úton a bírói meggyőződés felé. A készülő büntetőeljárási törvény kodifikációja 
Printart-Press, Debrecen, 2015. pp. 117-126..; ELEK BALÁZS: A büntető eljárásjog tudomány hatása a birói 
gyakorlatra, in: BÁRD PETRA - HACK PÉTER - HOLÉ KATALIN (ed.): Pusztai László emlékére. Országos 
Kriminológiai Intézet, ELTE Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, Budapest, 2014. pp. 45-56. 
41 SZABÓ 2 0 1 5 , p . 126. 
42 Az új büntetőeljárási törvény szabályozási elvei - A Kormány 2015. február 11. napján megtartott ülésén elfogadott 
előterjesztés (Szabályozási Elvek 2015.). Fonás: http://www.komiany.hU/download/d/l 2/40000/20150224%20M% 
20el%C5%91 terjeszt%C3%A9s%20az%20%C3%BAj%20b%C3%BCntet%C5%91 elj%C3%A 1 r%C3%Al si%20 
tC3%B6rv%C3%A9ny%20szab%C3%A 1 lyoz%C3%A 1 si%20elveir%C5%91 l.pdf (letöltés ideje: 2016. február 27.) 
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Koncepció szabályozási elveiből ugyan az olvasható ki, hogy a jogalkotó a kodifikáció 
során elsősorban nem a jogellenesen megszerzett bizonyítékok (generál-, és/vagy 
speciálklauzuláinak) újrafogalmazására koncentrál, azonban álláspontom az, hogy 
indokolt a jogintézmény felülvizsgálata. 
Maga a jogintézmény a - Koncepcióban vezérelvként megfogalmazott - tisztességes 
eljárás érvényesülésének követelménye. A jogellenesen megszerzett bizonyítékok 
esetén ugyanis kettős érdek ütközik egymással. Amíg a mérleg egyik serpenyőjében a 
terhelt büntetőjogi felelősségre vonásának követelménye áll - amely érdek azt diktálja, 
hogy a büntetőjogi felelősség megállapítására alkalmas (adott esetben perdöntő 
jelentőségű) bizonyítékok, ne kerüljenek kizárásra csupán azért, mert valamely előírás 
megszegésével szerezték meg azokat, - addig a mérleg másik oldalán álló érdek a 
büntetőeljárásbeli törvényesség betartásához, a büntetőeljárásban résztvevők jogainak a 
biztosításához kapcsolódik. 
Tanulmányomat két nagyobb egységből építettem fel. Első lépésként (lásd: II. pont) a 
hatályos büntetőeljárási törvény jogellenesen megszerzett bizonyítékok generálklauzulájából 
és az erre épülő joggyakorlatból indultam ki. 
Második egységként (lásd: III. pont) a témát érintő - elsősorban a büntető eljárásjogi 
szakirodalomban megjelent - koncepcionális javaslatokat ismertettem és értékeltem. 
